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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER:
STRIKING DOWN THE GUN FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT AS
BEYOND CONGRESSIONAL POWER;
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
I. FACTS
Respondent, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a high school senior, was arrested
for carrying a concealed handgun into his high school in San Antonio,
Texas, on March 10, 1992.1 He was charged with violating the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 19902 (Gun Free School Zones Act) which makes it
a federal crime for a person to knowingly possess a firearm in a place
that he or she knows is a school zone. 3 Respondent challenged the
constitutionality of the statute as beyond the power of Congress to
legislate control over public schools, and raised a motion to dismiss the
charge in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas. 4 The District Court denied the motion, concluding that the statute
was a valid exercise of congressional commerce power. 5 The respondent
appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
statute exceeded Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce. 6
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded with directions
to dismiss the indictment. 7 The government petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari review. 8 Since the Gun Free School Zones
Act did not regulate a commercial activity nor require that the firearm
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce, the United
1. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995). Respondent was a student at Edison
High School in San Antonio Texas. Id. School authorities received an anonymous tip and confronted
respondent, who then admitted to having the gun. Id. Lopez explained that he was planning to deliver
the gun to "Jason" for use in gang warfare, for which he (Lopez) would receive $40.00. United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affid, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The current 1995 codification is not the law
addressed in Lopez, Congress tried to "fix" it to comply with Lopez.
3. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Respondent was first charged under Texas law with possessing a
firearm on school premises, but those charges were dropped the following day after federal agents
charged him with violating the Gun Free School Zones Act. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
46.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994)). Lopez was then tried in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, at a bench trial. Id.
4. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345 (discussing the proceedings below).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1367-68.
7. Id. at 1368.
8. United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994) (granting certiorari).
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States Supreme Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act exceeds
the constitutional authority of Congress.9
II. LEGAL HISTORY
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce. 10 Although
Congress possesses this regulatory power, the United States Supreme
Court also has the power to review congressional legislation.lI Addition-
ally, when Congress has not legislated in a particular area of interstate
commerce, it still maintains a dormant commerce power which the Court
may enlist to strike down state laws which substantially affect interstate
commerce. 12 Utilized in this manner, the dormant commerce power acts
as an exclusive reserve of congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce. 13
In 1824, the Supreme Court first addressed the nature of federal
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 14 in which Chief Justice John
Marshall laid the groundwork for Commerce Clause adjudication.15
Chief Justice Marshall stated that Congress could regulate commerce
between and among states, but could not regulate commerce which was
wholly intrastate. 16
For nearly one hundred years following Gibbons, most of the
Court's decisions involving commerce power dealt with states passing leg-
islation that conflicted with congressional dormant commerce power.17
9. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (determining that the Commerce Clause
does not provide the federal government with a general police power similar to the states' broad
police power). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress the right to regulate commerce
among the states).
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
1i. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137, 147 (1803) (finding that Article 3, Section 2
of the Constitution provides the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases in law and equity
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States).
12. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (determining that a state
may not erect a barrier against interstate trade). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
227-32 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) (stating that a federal law does not need to be enacted in
order for the appellant to have a right to be free from over-reaching state legislation designed to
regulate interstate commerce).
13. Cf. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995) (holding
that the Commerce Clause also contains a negative command, known as the dormant Commerce
Clause, and concluding that it serves to prevent states from placing burdens on interstate commerce
even when Congress has not legislated on the subject).
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
16. Id. at 193-94. In Gibbons, the Court concluded that the word "commerce" described com-
mercial intercourse and was regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. Id. at
189-93. The Court reasoned that one of the primary objectives of the delegates to the constitutional
convention was to address the need for federal governmental power over commerce. Id. Further, the
Court stated that the delegates understood commerce to encompass the conduct at issue in this case,
navigation, and therefore it was too late for any attempt to restrict the word "commerce" to a meaning
excluding navigation. Id.
17. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (finding that a
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At the turn of the twentieth century, in response to controversies arising
out of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,18 the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890,19 and the industrialization of American society, 20 Commerce
Clause adjudication became more frequent as the amount of federal
legislation increased.21
In response to this increase in federal legislation, two distinct judi-
cial approaches emerged. 22 The "direct-indirect" approach involved an
analysis of whether federal legislation had a direct or an indirect relation
to interstate commerce. 23 Whereas regulation of the trade of goods
among states directly related to interstate commerce, common examples
of "indirect" effects included manufacturing, production and mining.24
The second approach involved an analysis of whether federal legisla-
tion substantially affected interstate commerce. 25 This approach allowed
Congress to regulate activities that both directly and indirectly affected
interstate commerce as long as those indirect effects were substantial. 26
Pennsylvania law regulating boat pilots was not repugnant to the Commerce Clause in its dormant
state). But see United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72-74 (1838). Coombs is a rare case in
which the Court did address the Commerce Clause rather than the dormant Commerce Clause during
the century following Gibbons. In Coombs, the Court determined that a law passed by Congress
making it a federal crime to steal goods from a beached ship was valid under the Commerce Clause.
Id.
18. Interstate Commerce Act, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§
10101-11917 (1994)) (providing federal regulation of the railroads).
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1,26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994)) (providing federal jurisdiction over, and sanctions against, the restraint of foreign and
interstate trade, including any attempt or conspiracy to monopolize a trade).
20. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. Rev. 1387, 1445
(1987) (describing a transformation in judicial and legislative thinking such that the modem commerce
power could be appropriately used to suppress the vices of too much competition).
21. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) [hereinafter
The Shreveport Rate Cases] (concluding that Congress may regulate intrastate railroad rates where
there is a substantial relation to interstate traffic); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903)
(holding that the Commerce Clause provides Congress with the power to prohibit lotteries carried on in
interstate commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (holding that the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 did not prohibit the formation of a sugar manufacturing monopoly
exclusively within the state of Pennsylvania because any relation to interstate commerce was indirect).
22. See The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351 (concluding that Congress may regulate
intrastate railroad rates where there is a substantial relation to interstate traffic); E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. at 14-17 (citing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888)) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 did not prohibit the formation of a sugar manufacturing monopoly exclusively within the state of
Pennsylvania because any relation to interstate commerce was indirect).
23. See E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 17 (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 did not
prohibit the formation of a sugar manufacturing monopoly exclusively within the state of Pennsylvania
because any relation to interstate commerce was indirect); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20-22 (finding production
of refined sugar indirectly affects interstate commerce).
24. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935 as outside the definition of commerce); E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 17
(finding manufacturing is not commerce); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20-22 (finding production of refined sugar
indirectly affects interstate commerce).
25. See, e.g., The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351 (concluding that Congress may regulate
intrastate railroad rates where there is a substantial relation to interstate traffic).
26. See id. (concluding that Congress may regulate intrastate railroad rates where there is a
substantial relation to interstate traffic); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
41-43 (1937) (finding the indirect effects of steel manufacturing substantially affected interstate
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Therefore, when using the "substantially affects" approach, the Su-
preme Court allowed for federal regulation over a wider area of activities
than it did under the "direct-indirect" approach. 27
These two Commerce Clause theories formed the bases for the
United States Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions in the
historical confrontation between the Supreme Court and President
Roosevelt as he implemented his "New Deal." 28 After the Court repeat-
edly struck down legislation aimed at improving conditions for workers
during the Great Depression, 29 the Court abandoned the direct-indirect
approach to Commerce Clause adjudication and shifted dramatically to
the "substantially affects" doctrine. 30 In the landmark case, NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,31 the Court analyzed the constitutionality
of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.32 The Court found that
steel manufacturing substantially affected interstate commerce.33
commerce).
27. Compare The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 351 (concluding that Congress may regulate
intrastate railroad rates where there is a substantial relation to interstate traffic) with E.C. Knight, 156
U.S. at 17 (finding that the formation of a sugar manufacturing monopoly exclusively within the state
of Pennsylvania had an indirect relation to interstate commerce).
28. DAVID E. HAMILTON, FROM NEW DAY To NEW DEAL: AMERICAN FARM POLICY FROM HOOVER
To ROOSEVELT, 1928-1933, at 237-50 (1991) (describing the New Deals' federal farm policies which
included production controls, price supports, and credit relief as part of Roosevelt's program of
recovery and reform in 1933).
29. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 304 (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936) (striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (striking down a pension
provision of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33
(1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power to the President).
30. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 49 (upholding the National Labor Relations Act of
1935). This dramatic shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence coincided with President Roosevelt's
court packing plan. See MAX FREEDMAN, ANNOTATION, ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER, THEIR COR-
RESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 371-72 (1967). Roosevelt sent Congress a plan to reorganize the federal
courts on February 5, 1937. Id. at 371. The President's plan was to bring the total of Supreme Court
justices up from nine to fifteen, and to add a new justice for every justice who did not retire after
reaching age 70. Id. At least six of the current justices were beyond the age of 70 when the plan was
sent to Congress. Id. After the plan was sent to Congress, the Court suddenly changed course and
began endorsing federal legislation. Id. at 372. Justice Roberts changed sides and was the crucial
vote in the Court's change of course. Id. He actually changed his position prior to the time the plan
was given to Congress but the opinion's reporting was delayed for other reasons. Id. This gave a
false appearance that Justice Roberts acted in response to Roosevelt's court packing plan.
31. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
32. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1994)). It is a violation of
the Act for employers to engage in unfair labor practices affecting commerce. See Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 301 U.S. at 22.
33. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 43. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation was a
completely integrated enterprise and the fourth largest producer of steel in the United States with
nineteen subsidiaries. Id. at 26. The Corporation drew in raw materials from four states and had sales
offices in twenty cities throughout the United States. Id. at 26-27. The Court refused to ignore the
realities of the modem national economy and examine direct and indirect effects in an "intellectual
vacuum." Id. at 41.
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Therefore, the Court held the Act was a valid exercise of congressional
commerce power.
34
Four years after Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court upheld the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 193835 in United States v. Darby.36 The Court
in Darby determined that Congress was free to exclude goods from
interstate commerce that it found injurious to the health and welfare of
its citizens. 37 Further, the Court found that there were no constitutional
restrictions on the motive or purpose of legislative judgment in regards
to the exercise of the commerce power.38
In 1942, the Court expanded the application of the commerce
power in Wickard v. Filburn.39 In this case, an Ohio dairy farmer was
fined for violating the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193840 for
growing more wheat than he was allowed under the marketing quota
established for his farm. 4 1 The Court developed an aggregate theory
which allowed Congress to reach entirely intrastate activities based on the
substantial effects caused by replicating an individual's activity on a
national scale. 42 The Court concluded that even if the farmer's activity
was local, and was not regarded as commerce, it could still be reached by
Congress if it substantially affected interstate commerce. 43 The Court
determined that the acts of one individual, combined with the acts of
other individuals "similarly situated," had a substantial effect on the
price of wheat in interstate commerce. 44
Following Wickard, the Court has upheld federal legislation aimed
at civil rights violations, 45 organized crime, 46 and regulation of fire-
34. Id. at 49.
35. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
201-215 (1994)).
36. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court found that Congress could prohibit
shipment of lumber in interstate commerce that had been produced in violation of federal minimum
wage laws. Id. at 123. Further, Congress could prohibit the employment of persons at below the
minimum wage in producing goods to be shipped in interstate commerce. Id.
37. ld. at 114.
38. Id. at 115.
39. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
40. Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 30, § 1,52 Stat. 31, as amended (1938) (current provision at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1340 (1994)).
41. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114-15. In this case, it was the Ohio dairy farmer's practice to grow
winter wheat each year, sell some of the harvest, feed some to his livestock, use some to make flour
for his own use, and save some for seed. Id. at 114.
42. Id. at 125.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (concluding Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise of commerce power); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (finding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 extends to any restaurant
serving food that has been purchased through interstate commerce).
46. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (finding that intrastate loan sharking
activities substantially affect interstate commerce).
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arms. 47 From the landmark case of Jones & Laughlin Steel, to the
present, the Court has uniformly held that Congress has operated within
its power under the Commerce Clause in passing federal legislation.
However, on April 26, 1995, the Court concluded an Act of Congress
was beyond the scope of the commerce power. 48
III. CASE ANALYSIS
A. SUPREME COURT MAJORITY HOLDS AN ACT OF CONGRESS BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF ITS COMMERCE POWER
In United States v. Lopez, 49 the United States Supreme Court
addressed congressional commerce power relative to the passage of the
Gun Free School Zones Act.50 For the first time in almost sixty years the
Court declared an Act of Congress unconstitutional as beyond the scope
of power provided by the Commerce Clause.51
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in a five-four
decision, 52 struck down the Gun Free School Zones Act by beginning
with the principle that "[tihe Constitution creates a Federal Government
of enumerated powers." 53 The Court acknowledged that among those
powers, the Constitution grants Congress the right to regulate interstate
commerce. 54 In finding that the federal legislation in Lopez went be-
yond the scope of congressional commerce power, the Court purported
not to disturb current case law, but rather, declined to expand it further. 55
1. Historical Analysis Defines the Outer Limits of Congress's
Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce
The Court defined the nature of congressional commerce power as
the right to prescribe rules governing interstate commerce.5 6 The Court
stated, however, that congressional regulation is restricted to commerce
that involves more than one state. 57 The Court delineated the historical
progression of Commerce Clause jurisprudence beginning with the Inter-
47. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (interpreting the possession element of a
federal gun regulation as requiring an additional nexus to interstate commerce).
48. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
49. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
50. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
51. The last case to hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional as beyond the scope of its com-
merce power was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936), in which the Court struck down
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.
52. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
53. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. all. I, § 8).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1634.
56. Id. at 1627-28 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824)).
57. Id. at 1627 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90).
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state Commerce Act of 188758 and ending with the modem-era cases of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 59 United States v. Darby,60 and Wick-
ard v. Filburn;6 1 and the Court determined that these three cases greatly
expanded the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause.62 The
Court stated that this doctrinal change in Commerce Clause juris-
prudence reflected a view that earlier cases had artificially constrained
Congress's authority to regulate, interstate commerce. 63 However, the
Court reasoned that even under these modern-era precedents, the
Commerce Clause "power is subject to outer limits." 64 Therefore, since
the latest expansion of the scope of the Commerce Clause in Wickard,
the Court stated it must determine whether Congress has a rational basis
for its conclusion that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate
commerce .65
The Court identified and affirmed three broad categories of activity
which Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; and, (3) activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.66 Although the Court admitted that case law had not been clear
regarding the third category in terms of whether an activity must
"affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce, the Court held
that the proper test involves an analysis of whether the activity to be reg-
58. See Interstate Commerce Act, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§
10101-11917 (1994) (providing federal regulation of the railroads). The Court stated that the Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 ushered in a new era of federal
regulation under the commerce power. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
59. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (describing the
decision).
60. 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (describing the
decision).
61. 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (describing the
decision).
62. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627-29.
63. Id. at 1628.
64. Id. at 1628-29. The Court stated that in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the
scope of the commerce power must be considered in light of the principles of federalism, and that to
embrace too indirect or remote effects upon interstate commerce would "effectually obliterate the
distinction" between national and local activities and "create a completely centralized government."
Id. (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37). Further, the Court noted that Congress may
regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 1629 (citing Darby,
312 U.S. at 119-20; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
65. Id. at 1629 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276-80 (1981)); see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 n. 27 (1968) (stating that nowhere has
"the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on [interstate] commerce as an
excuse" for a general regulatory power over an individual's activities); see also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971) (finding that intrastate extortion activities directly affect interstate
commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294. 299-301 (1964) (finding that racial discrimination
in restaurants has direct and adverse effect on interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (finding discrimination by hotels and motels impedes
interstate travel).
66. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-30 (citations omitted).
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ulated "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 67 The Court deter-
mined that it is the third category of authority which applies to the Gun
Free School Zones Act and proceeded to examine whether it fell within
the scope of Congress's commerce power under the "substantially
affects" doctrine.68
2. Gun Free School Zones Act Exceeds Congress's Commerce
Power
First, the Court compared the Gun Free School Zones Act to Wick-
ard, and found that Wickard involved an economic activity in a way that
gun possession in a school zone does not. 69 The Court explained that
Lopez involved a criminal statute which has nothing to do with any sort
of commercial enterprise, no matter how broadly "commerce" is
defined. 70 The Court found the Gun Free School Zones Act could not
be sustained under cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which, when viewed
in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 71
Second, the Court stated that Congress was not normally required to
make formal findings concerning the burden an activity has on interstate
commerce. 72 However, the Court stated that such findings would enable
it to evaluate the legislative judgment. 73 The Court stated that the Gun
Free School Zones Act contains no jurisdictional element which might
limit its reach to those firearm possessions that affect interstate
commerce. 74 Without jurisdictional limitations, Congress could reach
firearm possessions that involve completely intrastate activities, over
which Congress has no authority. 75 The Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that Congress has acquired institutional expertise
through other firearm regulations. 76 The Court stated that the Gun Free
School Zones Act represents a sharp break from the longstanding
pattern of federal firearms legislation.77
67. Id. at 1630.
68. Id. at 1630-34.
69. Id. at 1630.
70. Id. at 1630-31. The Court noted that under our federal system of government, the states have
primary authority to define and enforce criminal law; and that federal criminal laws for conduct
which is already illegal under state laws, change the sensitive relationship between state and federal
criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 1630 n. 3 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,635 (1993)).
71. Id. at 1631.
72. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964)).
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337 (1971)).
75. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress the right to regulate commerce among
the states).
76. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
77. Id. The Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit that to import previous findings from other federal
firearm legislation is inappropriate to justify the Gun Free School Zones Act because they do not speak
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The Court considered, and rejected, the government's essential
argument that firearm possession in a school zone substantially affects
interstate commerce by the economic impact associated with both violent
crime and diminished productivity.78 The Court reviewed the three main
premises underlying the government's essential argument. 79 First, the
government stated that the costs of violent crime are substantial and
spread throughout the population through the mechanism of insurance
costs. 80 Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of people to travel
into what they perceive as unsafe areas of the country. 81 Finally, the
presence of guns in schools harms the educational process by threaten-
ing the learning environment. 82 This handicaps the educational process
which resu!ts in less productive citizens. 83 The Government concluded
that this resulting diminished productivity adversely affects the national
economy .84
The Court considered the fact that the Government admitted, by
implication, that through its "cost of crime" reasoning, Congress could
regulate all violent crime no matter how tenuously it related to interstate
commerce. 85 The Court explained that under the "national productivi-
ty" reasoning, Congress would be able to regulate any activity that it
found was related to an individual citizen's economic productivity. 86
The Court concluded that this argument was without merit because if
accepted, the Court would be hard pressed to find any activity that the
federal government could not regulate. 87
Furthermore, the Court concluded that if Congress's commerce
power could reach regulation of activities that affect the learning environ-
ment, then Congress could regulate the educational process directly. 88
Ultimately, the Court attempted to avoid expanding the scope of the
commerce power to a degree which would allow Congress to super-
impose federal law in areas of traditional state jurisdiction. 89
to the Act's subject matter or its relationship to interstate commerce. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez,
2 F.3d. 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991)).





86. Id. The Court provided the example of family law, including marriage, divorce, and child
custody. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1633. The Court suggested that federal regulation of education would include elemen-
tary and secondary educational curriculums that Congress determines have a "significant" effect on
class room learning, and thereby substantially affect interstate commerce. Id.
89. See id. at 1633-34 (discussing the perpetual question regarding the extent of congressional
power granted by the Commerce Clause).
1996] 1089
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In order to further establish the limit of congressional commerce
power, the Court adopted an analysis of whether an intrastate activity is
commercial or noncommercial, analogous to Justice Marshall's analysis
in Gibbons v. Ogden.90 Although Justice Breyer argued that Congress
could have rationally concluded that schools fall on the commercial side
of the line, the Court rejected this conclusion without discussing whether
or not it was rational. 91 The Court dismissed Justice Breyer's argument
because it was unlimited. 92 In so doing, the Court recognized that the
Constitution mandates a degree of legal uncertainty in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 93 The Court stated that because the Constitution withheld
from Congress a "plenary police power," there is bound to be uncer-
tainty, however, Congress has operated within this framework ever since
Marbury v. Madison.94
Respecting this framework of limited federal power, the Court
compared Jones & Laughlin Steel,95 with Justice Cardozo's concurring
opinion in A.LA. Schecter Poultry v. United States,96 and agreed that the
congressional commerce power is of limited scope. 97 The Court admit-
ted that formulations which measure the degree of the effect upon
interstate commerce are not precise, but found that they point to a
correct decision: possession of a gun in a school zone is not an econom-
ic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
interstate commerce.98
The Court stated that Alfonso Lopez was a local student attending a
local school. 99 The Court found that there was no indication he had
recently moved in interstate commerce, nor found any nexus to interstate
commerce. 100 Therefore, the Court concluded that in order to uphold
the Gun Free School Zones Act, it would have to "pile inference upon
inference" in such a way that would "convert congressional authority
90. Compare id. at 1633 (discussing a commercial-noncommercial distinction in commerce
clause jurisprudence) with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-91 (1824) (finding navigation
is a commercial enterprise).
91. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-1634.
92. Id. The Court found that Justice Breyer's argument is without limits because, depending on
the level of generality, any activity could be seen as commercial. Id. at 1633. The Court suggested
for example, that child rearing could as easily be seen as commercial because it equips children with
the skills they need to survive in the workplace. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
95. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (finding that congressional
commerce power is necessarily a question of degree).
96. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J..
concurring) (stating that there is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between
national and local activities in commerce).
97. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34.





under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."'Ol Although the Court admitted that previous
cases have given deference to congressional action, and that broad
language in some of those cases has suggested a possibility of further
expansion, the Court declined to proceed any further.102 The Court
stated that to do so it would have to conclude that the "Constitution's
enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not
enumerated"103 and that there will never be a distinction between
national and local activities regarding commerce power. 104 The Court
held that it was unwilling to expand commerce power any further and
affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.105
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE APPLIES THE PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERALISM
Lopez contained six separate opinions. Justice Kennedy stated, in
his concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, that the history of
the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause gave him some
pause.106 However, he joined the Court's opinion because he believed
that Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 107 Katzenbach v.
McClung,108 Perez v. United States,109 and like authorities were not called
into question.llO Justice Kennedy counseled that the history of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence contains at least two lessons: (1) that con-
tent-based boundaries without more, are imprecise in defining the limits
of commerce power; and, (2) that the Court and the legal system have an
immense stake in the stability of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. IlI
Justice Kennedy referred to stare decisis as the fundamental restraint fore-
closing the Court from reverting to eighteenth-century ideas of
commerce. 1 2 Additionally, Justice Kennedy stated that stare decisis pre-
vents the Court from limiting congressional regulation of undoubtedly
101. Id.
102. Id.; see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-80
(1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
299-301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,252-53 (1964).
103. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 1, 195 (1824)).
104. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,30 (1937)).
105. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (1993) (holding that the Gun Free
School Zones Act is invalid as beyond Congress's commerce power).
106. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The history to which Justice Kennedy
referred is that of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the economic
transition from eighteenth-century local markets to the modem day national market. See id.
107. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
108. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
109. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
110. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634-37 (Kennedy J., concurring).
111. Id. at 1637.
112. Id.
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commercial activities by determining whether sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce exists. 113
Justice Kennedy recognized the Court's flexible framework regard-
ing state and federal balance.11 4 However, he suggested that this case
required the Court to consider its place in our system of government and
to appreciate the significance of federalism in the Constitution's
structure. 115
Regarding the structural element of federalism, Justice Kennedy
determined that there was uncertainty as to the existence, contents, and
standards of the judicial role in maintaining the Framers design.l1 6 After
explaining federalist theory in its historical context,117 Justice Kennedy
determined that in order to preserve federalism, the Court must intervene
when government intrudes into legislative activity traditionally reserved
to the states.11 8 However, Justice Kennedy stated that when the federal
government is acting under the Commerce Clause, preserving federalism
presents a greater challenge.1 9 Justice Kennedy concluded that it was
the degree to which the statute upset the federal balance that made it
unconstitutional. 120
C. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE STATES A DESIRE TO TURN BACK
THE CLOCK
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion considered the entire history
of the commerce power from its conceptual beginnings in the Federalist
Papers,121 to its present day application by the Court.122 He wrote
separately to observe how far the case law has drifted from the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause.1 23 Furthermore, he suggested
that in the future, the Court ought to be more faithful to the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause.124
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)).
115. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 1637-38. Justice Kennedy felt that the uncertainty of the judicial role in maintaining
federalism was ironic. Id. He stated that of the Constitution's four structural elements, separation of
powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism, it was federalism that was the unique
contribution to political science and theory made by the Framers. Id.
117. Id. at 1638-39.
118. Id. at 1639. Justice Kennedy stated that the statute foreclosed states from exercising their
own judgment in an area to which the states rightly claim by history and expertise. Id. at 1640.
119. Id. at 1639 (regarding the challenges inherent in maintaining the balance in the other
structural elements of the Constitution, such as separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial
review).
120. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay), Nos. 7, 12, 21,36 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 40 (James
Madison).
122. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-50 (Thomas, J., concurring).




Justice Thomas suggested that the "substantial affects" test should
be reconsidered in an appropriate case in order to make a more coherent
test. 125 His concern was that the current test had the tendency to elimi-
nate the distinction between national and local activities and allowed
creation of a completely centralized government.126 Justice Thomas
concluded that the Court's present construction of the scope of congres-
sional commerce power nearly circumvents the Tenth Amendment.1
27
Consequently, he suggested it is for this kind of fundamental textual
problem that the Court should reexamine the "substantial affects"
test. 128 The dissenting justices inferred that the Court may have already
taken that step by adopting a "commercial-noncommercial" approach
to analysis in addition to the "substantially affects" approach.1
29
D._ THE DISSENTING JUSTICES ARGUE FOR MODERN-ERA DEFERENCE TO
CONGRESS
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that the welfare of future
foreign and interstate commerce depends on the character and education
of children.130 He stated that Congress may regulate possession of guns
in or near schools to ensure a productive future the same way it regulates
asbestos or alcohol. 131 Justice Stevens concluded that guns are commer-
cial articles and can be used to restrain commerce.1 32 Therefore, Justice
Stevens stated that Congress's commerce power to regulate firearms
"includes the power to prohibit possession of guns at any location
because of their potentially harmful use." 133
Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, referred to the practice of
deferring to rationally based legislative judgments as an absolutely
125. Id. at 1642-43.
126. Id. at 1642. Justice Thomas warned that if a "substantial affects" test can be appended to
the Commerce Clause, it could be appended to every other power of the Federal Government. Id. at
1644. This would allow Congress to regulate all matters that substantially affect the military,
bankruptcies, tax collection, etc. Id.
127. Id. at 1645 (Thomas J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated that "our case law could be read
to reserve to the United States all powers not expressly prohibited by the Constitution." Id.
128. Id. Justice Thomas stated in a footnote that:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many
believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past
60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we
cannot wipe the slate clean.
Id. at 1650 n. 8. Compare id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the restraints of stare
decisis) with Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387,
1445-55 (1987) (discussing the enormous reliance interests that have been created based on
commerce clause jurisprudence).
129. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer J., dissenting) (stating that the statute falls well within
the scope of the commerce power as the Court has understood it over the last sixty years).
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essential element of judicial restraint. 134 Justice Souter concentrated on
the era following the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887135
until the decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel.136 He suggested that it was
not merely a coincidence that tremendous changes in the Court's
conceptions of its authority occurred simultaneously in 1937 under both
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.1 37 Thus, Justice Souter asked
whether the Court did anything in its decision but signal a return to the
"untenable jurisprudence" prior to 1937.138 Justice Breyer answered
that question affirmatively by stating that the Gun Free School Zones
Act does fall within the scope of congressional commerce power as the
Court has understood it for the past sixty years. 139
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsberg.140 Justice Breyer provided the
Court with an extensive appendix of congressional and other federal
government materials in an effort to demonstrate how Congress could
have rationally concluded that gun possession in or near schools sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. 14 1
Justice Breyer applied three basic principles in interpreting the
scope of the commerce power: (1) Congress may regulate local activities
that significantly affect interstate commerce; 142 (2) the Court must con-
sider the cumulative effect, not the effect of an individual act, on inter-
state commerce; 43 and, (3) the appropriate standard of review is whether
Congress had a rational basis for believing that the activity had a
significant relation to interstate commerce. 144
134. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).
135. Interstate Commerce Act. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§
10101-11917 (1994)) (providing federal regulation of the railroads); see supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text (explaining Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the Commerce Clause from 1887 to
1937).
136. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also supra note 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing the
decision).
137. Id. at 1653 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
138. Id. at 1654. Justice Souter stated that the Court pointed toward two other considerations that
it might apply in the future to rational basis scrutiny: (1) whether the congressional act deals with
subjects of traditional state regulation, and; (2) whether the act contains explicit factual findings that
support a determination that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Id.
Although Justice Souter determined that the legislation in question does pass the rational review
standard and concluded that the Court's decision is probably just a misstep, he raises a caveat. "Not
every epochal case comes in epochal trappings. Jones & Laughlin Steel did not reject the
direct-indirect standard in so many words; it just said the relation of the regulated subject matter was
direct enough." Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1,41-43 (1937)).
139. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1657-64.
141. Id. at 1664-71 (app.).
142. Id. at 1657 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824), and Wickard v.
Filbur, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
143. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28).
144. ld. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264,276-77 (1981)).
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First, Justice Breyer determined that Congress could have rationally
believed that there was either a significant or a substantial relation
between gun-related violence in schools and the quality of education.1
45
Justice Breyer stated that once Congress determined that possession of
guns in schools affects the quality of education, then Congress could
have rationally concluded that education is so intertwined with the
national economy that gun-related violence in or near schools is a
commercial problem. 146
Justice Breyer compared the effect on the national economy of the
prohibited loan sharking activity in Perez v. United States, 147 to the
effect of the threat of gun-related violence in schools.148 Justice Breyer
stated that Congress could have rationally considered that they were
identical threats in kind.149 He stated that the inability to teach basic
skills in Schools has just as negative an impact on the economy as does
organized crime.150
Justice Breyer faulted the Court for disregarding the express hold-
ing in Wickard, that even though home consumption in wheat may not
be commerce, it could still be regulated so long as it substantially affects
commerce. 15 1 He argued that if the Court meant to distinguish among
broad categories such as whether an activity is educational or commer-
cial, the line would be nearly impossible to draw because schools serve
both commercial and educational purposes by teaching technical skills
and academic disciplines.152 In the alternative, Justice Breyer suggested
that Congress could have rationally concluded that schools fall on the
commercial side of the line.153
Finally, Justice Breyer expressed concern that the Court's decision
threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that was well settled. 154 The
Court agreed with Justice Breyer, that in some cases, legal uncertainty
cannot be avoided. 155
145. Id. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
148. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1662 (Breyer J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also found it difficult to distinguish
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), because the prohibited act of racial discrimination was
not a commercial activity itself, but had a substantial effect on the ability of African Americans to
travel in interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1662.
151. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663-64 (Breyer, I., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (stating that in 1990 the "business of schooling" required expenditures of 230 billion
dollars for primary and secondary education).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1633.
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IV. IMPACT
Following Lopez, it is likely that there will be a substantial increase
in litigation challenging federal laws passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause power. Since this decision was handed down on April 26, 1995,
several federal statutes have been challenged based on its holding.15 6 At
least three district courts have followed Lopez and found that the Child
Support Recovery Act of 1992157 (CSRA) is unconstitutional.1 58 District
courts have also struck down the Freedom of Access to Abortion Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994,159 the Violence Against Women Act of 1994160
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980161 as unconstitutional. 16 2 Similarly, the federal
156. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995) (challenging 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) (1988), which prohibits intrastate possession, distribution, and sale of controlled substances);
United States v. Carolina, No. 94-6439, 1995 WL 422862, at *2 (10th Cir. July 19, 1995) (challenging
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993), which prohibits car-jacking); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D.
Conn. 1996) (challenging 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), which provides civil rights remedies for violence
against women); United States v. Taylor, 897 F. Supp. 1500, 1502-03 (D. Conn. 1995) (challenging 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988), which prohibits gun possession by a convicted felon);.United States v.
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360,362 (D. Ariz. 1995) (challenging 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. V 1993), which
prohibits failure to pay child support across state lines); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423,
1425 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (challenging 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (Supp. 1995), which provides injunctive relief
for obstruction of access to abortion clinic entrances).
157. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 228 (1993)).
158. See United States v. Mussari, 912 F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (D. Ariz. 1995) (denying plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration of a court order dismissing an indictment based upon a finding that CSRA
was unconstitutional); United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (concluding
CSRA is unconstitutional due to a lack of jurisdictional element affecting interstate commerce); United
States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (concluding CSRA is unconstitutional on
grounds of federalism and comity); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Ariz. 1995)
(holding CSRA is invalid as beyond the scope of congressional commerce power). But see United
States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (M. D. Penn 1996) (concluding CSRA is valid under the
Commerce Clause); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding
CSRA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1037
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding CSRA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause as applied); United
States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1239 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding CSRA is constitutional); United
States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 91-92 (D. Conn. 1995) (concluding CSRA is a valid exercise of
congressional commerce power because violations would substantially affect interstate commerce);
United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (concluding CSRA is a valid exercise
of congressional commerce power due to an activity that substantially relates to interstate commerce);
United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 617 (W.D. Va. 1995) (finding Lopez does not apply to a
regulation prohibiting the use of interstate travel as a means of avoiding child support obligations),
vacated, No. CRIM. A. 95-96-R, 1996 WL 396144, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 9, 1996) (finding venue not
proper therefore not reaching the constitutional question); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp.
1327, 1330 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding CSRA is constitutional even in light of the Lopez decision due to
requirement of an interstate relationship).
159. Freedom of Access to Abortion Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (Supp. 1995)) [hereinafter FACE].
160. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (1995)) [hereinafter VAWA].
161. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 3300 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 9601 to 9675 (1995)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
162. Regarding FACE, see Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791, 819 (W.D.N.C. 1996) which
found FACE void as beyond congressional commerce power, but see United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d
675, 688 (7th Cir. 1995), where it was concluded that FACE is constitutional under the Commerce
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carjacking statute 163 has been found lacking the requisite nexus to
interstate commerce at the district court level following the Fifth Circuit
Court's decision in Lopez. 164
A federal law prohibiting gun possession by felons is also among
those federal statutes challenged. 165 At this point, there is no way of
knowing whether the Court will find the appropriate nexus to interstate
commerce by relying on the fact that firearms or their component parts
have traveled in interstate commerce. The same question presents itself
regarding the federal carjacking statute' 66 and the federal arson
statute.167
Aside from criminal law, education, and family law, other areas of
concern are proposed federal laws affecting tort reform,168 late term abor-
tions, 169 and same sex marriages.1 70 It is simply too soon to tell whether
the Court will take a proactive role in enforcing its determination that the
Clause, and Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11 th Cir. 1995), where the court found FACE a valid
exercise of congressional commerce power). Regarding VAWA, see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech-
nic & State Univ., No. CIV. A. 95-1358-R, 1996 WL 431097, at *24 (W.D. Va. July 26. 1996) where
VAWA was deemed unconstitutional as beyond congressional commerce power and enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment, but see Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp 608, 617 (D. Conn. 1996)
where it was concluded that VAWA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Regarding
CERCLA see United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1533 (S.D. Ala. 1996) where CERCLA as
applied was found to exceed the federal government's power under the Commerce Clause. This case
was subsequently reversed by United States v. Olin Corp., No. 96-6645, 1997 WL 104161, at *4 (1 th
Cir. March 25, 1997).
163. Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384, and amended Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1970 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2119) (prohibiting use of a firearm in connection with
automobile theft).
164. See United States v. Mallory, 884 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (affirming the dismissal of a
federal indictment for carjacking by applying to 18 U.S.C. § 2119 the Fifth Circuit's analysis in United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), and finding that carjacking
does not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Cardoza, 914 F. Supp. 683, 684 (D. Mass. 1996) (challenging 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) which prohibits gun possession by felons).
166. See Anti Car Theft Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384, and amended Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1970 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2119) (prohibiting use of a firearm in connection
with automobile theft).
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting any individual from using an
explosive to damage or destroy any building, vehicle, or real or personal property used in interstate or
foreign commerce). But see United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1399 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
rental status of the residence provided the necessary nexus to interstate commerce for federal
jurisdiction over defendant's conspiracy to commit arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 783 (1997); United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding 18
U.S.C. § 844(i) is a valid exercise of congressional commerce power), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838
(1995). Although the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, Justice
Scalia would grant the petition, vacate the judgment, and remand for further consideration in light of
Lopez. Ramey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1838, 1839 (1995).
168. See H.R. 4472, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994) <http://rs9.10c.gov/home/thomos.html>
(providing that the prevailing party in a tort action is entitled to attorney fees).
169. See H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995), microformed on CIS N. 95-H523-25 (Congres-
sional Info. Serv.) (prohibiting partial birth abortions). This bill was vetoed by President Clinton on
April 10, 1996. See 1996 WL 166741, at *6 (White House) (press release regarding President's
remarks on H.R. 1833 veto).
170. See S. 1740, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) <http://www.hrcusa.org/issues/leg/domafbilltext.ht
ml> (protecting states from being compelled to honor another state's recognition of same sex
marriage).
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federal government is obliged to confine its legislative activities to only
those areas enumerated in the Constitution.171 However, the Lopez
decision may be seen as an effort by the Court to reinforce to Congress
the federalism principle and the need to exercise restraint when
legislating in areas of traditional state concern and expertise.
Margaret Lupkes
171. Cf. United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (failing to mention the Lopez
rationale). In Robertson, respondent was convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 because he invested
proceeds from unlawful activities in an Alaskan Gold Mine. Id. The Court found that the gold mine
operation was directly engaged in interstate commerce, therefore it was unnecessary to decide
whether respondent was engaged in an activity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Id.;
see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994) (codification of RICO).
